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WHEN IS A TAX NOT A TAX?
By ROBERT C. BROWN*

The title of this article is an obvious plagarism of a wellknown conundrum, and like that conundrum, can only be
answered by the use of a pun. However, it is a pun which
has frequent, though usually unconscious, legislative and judicial recognition. Both of these branches of our governmental machinery not infrequently make use of the term
"tax" when they actually mean something quite different.
The answer to this query, which this article will attempt
to substantiate, is that a so-called tax which is not for the
purpose of raising governmental revenue is, in fact, not a
tax at all. This is not to say that a tax in the true sense
may not have other purposes as well. Undoubtedly, a true
tax may be used to effectuate moral ends and may even be
intended to discourage the activities subjected to the tax. But
if no substantial revenue is contemplated from a monetary
exaction-that is to say that if it is expected to result in ending of the activity with respect to which it is imposed-the
exaction is not a tax. If it is to be sustained at all, it must
be sustained under some governmental power other than the
taxing power.'
But if this is true, the well-known dictum of Chief Justice
Marshall that the power to tax involves the power to de*Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1 Cf. the argument of counsel in McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27
(1904), at 36.
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stroy, ' '2 is unsound. This idea, though occasionally restated
by the Court,3 is obviously inconsistent with the theory just
stated, that a true tax is justified only for the purpose of
revenue. It may well be that a governmental exaction may
in fact be disastrous to the activity against which it is charged
and may therefore, result in little or no revenue, and still it
be a tax.4 If, however, the original purpose is the destruction of such activity, with the consequent intention that no
revenue actually will be obtained, the exaction is not believed
to be properly a tax.
The Supreme Court has, at least in recent years, recognized that the. broad statement of Chief Justice Marshall
must be at least somewhat limited. Thus, in Knowlton v.
Moore,5 a case sustaining the power of the federal government to levy an inheritance tax, the Court said
"This distinction shows the inapplicability to the case m hand of
the statement made by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall m McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431, 'that the power to tax involves the
power to destroy.' This principle is pertinent only when there is no
power to tax a particular subject, and has no relation to a case where

such right exists. In other words, the power to destroy which may
be the consequence of taxation is a reason why the right to tax should
be confined to subjects which may be lawfully embraced therein, even
although it happens that in some particular instance no great harm
may be caused by the exercise of the taxing authority as to a subject
which is beyond its scope. But this reasoning has no application to a
lawful tax, for if it had there would be an end to all taxation, that
is to say if a lawful tax can be defeated because the power which is
manifested by its imposition may when further exercised be destructive,
it would follow that every lawful tax would become unlawful, and
' 6
therefore no taxation whatever could be levied.
It must be conceded that.this language still recognizes the
possibility of a confiscatory tax, though the particular tax
involved was far from being such. But Mr. Justice Holmes,
2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) at 431.

3 See
at 327-8.
4 See
5 178
6 178

e. g. United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 322 (1872),
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911).
U. S. 41 (1900).
U. S. 60.
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at least, has recognized the fundamental unsoundness of this
famous but rather ill-considered statement of Chief Justice
Marshall, by flatly denying it in the following language
"The power to tax is not the power to destroy, while this Court
sits.,"7

While this statement was made in a dissenting opirion, its
truth will be demonstrated by a consideration of a number
of decisions of the Federal Supreme Court itself, where a socalled "tax" was invalidated because confiscatory, and therefore not really a tax. The power to tax is not the power to
destroy, because destruction of the thing or activity taxed
means destruction of revenue, which it is the primary purpose of a tax to produce.
But before considering the cases directly on the point, it
may be worth while to touch upon one or two allied points,
though only for the purpose of eliminating them from detailed consideration. The first of these is the rule that a
tax must be for a public purpose.8 The rule is clearly settled,
though its application is often uncertain. It is entirely clear
that this concept of a public purpose is rapidly expanding
at the present time. 9 But in any event the rule does not materially assist the thesis of this article, for it must be freely
admitted that destruction of certain activities may undoubtedly be for the public benefit, and therefore a public purpose.
The obtaining of revenue is an important, but by no means
the only, function of a government. The point that is made
here is that revenue is the essential purpose of the taxtng
function.
Growing out of this is the undoubted proposition that the
states, at least, may regulate and, indeed, distinctly discourage certain activities through their taxing power. A state
exaction may be sustained both as a license under the police
7 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218 (1928), at 223.
8 The leading case is Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655

(1874).
9 See note in (1928) 41 Harv. L. R. 775, "State and Municipal Excursion.
into Business as Public Purposes under the Taxing Power."
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power and a tax; 0 but even here it is generally held that if
the primary purpose is regulation rather than revenue, the
exaction is actually an exercise of the police power of the
state rather than its power to tax," and this, even though
the tax machinery is availed of in its collection.' 2 Such exactions are not subject to constitutional limitations upon taxation. Furthermore, while it is clear that the states may not
directly tax interstate commerce, they may impose a license
fee upon those engaged solely in such commerce, provided
the fee is not substantially in excess of the cost to the state
for the necessary supervision in the interest of public order
and safety 13 If, however, the assumed license fee is dearly
in excess of such cost of supervision, it will be regarded as
a tax and therefore unconstitutional, as a burden on inter4
state commerce.'
There is not infrequently language to be found in court
decisions that a state may go farther; that it may actually
impose a confiscatory tax and, therefore, destroy the activity,
which is thus taxed.' 5 It is believed, however, that no case
-at least no modern case-will be found where the so-called
tax which was sustained, was itself actually confiscatory 6
It is clear that a tax may be burdensome and still produce
substantial revenue, or at least be intended to. At any rate,
the Supreme Court of Georgia has directly decided that an
express power given to a city by its charter to tax money
lenders, does not include the power to impose a prohibitive
tax' 7 -which fits in exactly with the thesis of this article.
10

Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183 (1900).
11Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 N. E. 857 (1893), State v. Anderson, 144 Tenn. 564, 234 S. W 768 (1920). Cf.. License Tax Cases, 5.
Wall. (U. S.) 462 (1866), holding. that Congress may impose an excise tax
upon activities within a state which are prohibited by the local law.
12 Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind. 62 (1866).
13 Atlantic & Pacific Telegraph Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160 (1903).
14Postal Telegraph Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64 (1904).
15Probably the strongest language of this sort is that of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935), at 99-100. See also
Erwin v. Omaha, 118 Neb. 331, 224 N. W 692 (1929).
10 In both of the cases cited in note 15, supra, the court expressly states that
the tax was not actually confiscatory, or at least was not proved to be so.
17 Morton v. Macon, III Ga. 162, 36 S. E. 627 (1900).
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Nevertheless, the cases involving state exactions which
bear upon the exact point of this article are comparatively
rare. The reason for this has already been stated-namely,
that the states have very broad police powers in addition to
their taxing powers, so that if a particular monetary exaction cannot be sustained as a tax, it may nevertheless be sustained under the police power. Even if the exaction is clearly prohibitive, it may nevertheless fall within the police
power, unless it is clear that the activity at which it is directed is inherently so innocent that it cannot be driven out
by the state. Consequently, it is rarely essential for the
state to justify the exaction solely under the taxing power,
and the courts, not unnaturally, tend in their decisions to
confuse the police power and the taxing power. They will
talk of a "prohibitive tax" not really as an adjudication that
there actually is such a thing, but rather as a decision that
the state is justified in driving out the particular activity involved. The courts often reach such decisions without paying too much regard to what particular power is exercised
by the state in doing so.
But with the federal government the situation is quite different. It is fundamental in our constitutional law that the
powers of that government, while enormous, are nevertheless limited. It is not very realistic to say, as is sometimes
done, that the federal government has no police powers, for
it may clearly exercise its admitted powers for ends of public morals and safety, which are the basis of the police powers
of the states. Nevertheless, the federal government has no
general police powers, that is to say, it has no powers to protect public welfare, except within the bounds of its particular
powers granted expressly or impliedly by the Constitution.
On the other hand, it has what may be regarded for our
purposes as general taxing powers; there are, of course, limitations, but such limitations are not of concern in this connection. The problem of this article is therefore frequently
presented in connection with federal monetary exactions. If
a so-called federal tax cannot be sustained under the federal
taxing power, it is ordinarily unjustifiable. As will appear
hereafter, it will sometimes happen that a federal monetary
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exaction which cannot be sustained as a tax, will fall under
some other power of the federal government; but the frequent state recourse to a general police power is denied to
the federal government. Therefore, generally speaking, a
federal tax must be a tax in the true sense, or it is unconstitutional.
Perhaps a good case to mark a transition to the problem
of the federal taxing powers is laska Fish Co. v. Smith.18
Here the question was the validity of a tax imposed by the
Territory of Alaska. The problem is thus really more comparable with a state tax, though the Court quite naturally
treated it as involving some implications of the federal taxing power. The tax was on the manufacturing of fertilizers
from fish, and was quite heavy, though probably not prohibitive. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court,
claimed that the argument that the tax was prohibitive was
unsustained in fact. But this in itself weakens his subsequent statement that "Even if the tax should destroy a business it would not be made invalid or require compensation
upon that ground alone. Those who enter upon a business
take that risk."1 9
Obviously that statement is not contrary to the thesis of
this article. In the first place, the Court found that the tax
was not in fact ruinous to the industry, even though it discouraged it and was intended to do so. Furthermore, it
does not appear that even if the tax turned out to be prohibitive, it was intended so to be. It is probable that a tax
which is unintentionally prohibitive is still a tax, though probably not a very wise one.
There is no doubt, however, that a so-called tax imposed
by the federal government is sustainable, even though it is
very burdensome. 20 A distinct example of this is the federal
tax on the sale of theater tickets outside the box-office, of five
per cent of the excess over the box-office price, if that excess
be not over fifty cents, or of fifty per cent of the excess, if
such excess exceeds fifty cents. In a test of this tax, the court
18 255 U. S.44 (1921).
19255 U. S. 48.
20 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911).
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held this an excise tax and not confiscatory, although the
very terms of the Act showed that it would not be impossible to sell profitably at a figure above the box-office price,
of more than fifty cents or less than a dollar; though a person might still sell at an excess of more than a dollar. It
was also held that the undoubted fact that Congress intended
to discourage such ticket-scalping activities was not ma2
terial. 1
But notwithstanding all this, there are a number of cases
in the Supreme Court where federal statutes purporting to
impose taxes have been invalidated because of the fact that
the plain purpose was not to impose taxes at all, but actually
to exercise some regulatory power not within the scope of
the authority of the federal government. The first group
of these cases concerns federal liquor taxes.
Previous to the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment
there could be no dispute with respect to federal liquor taxes,
at least on this ground. The federal government imposed
many and heavy taxes, but the principal and, indeed, substantially the sole purpose .was revenue-which was at all
times very large. In fact it was held that the manufacturing and sale of liquor in territory where it was illegal by
22
local statutes, was nevertheless subject to federal taxation.
With the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment the situation changed. The federal government then had police
power with respect to the manufacture and sale of liquorsin fact the power and duty to prohibit such activities. This
power was exercised and this duty fulfilled by the enactment
of the Volstead Act. Section 35 of this Act provided that
anyone making an illegal sale of liquor (which had been
23
denounced as a crime by previous sections of the Act)
21 Alexander Theater Ticket Office v. United States, 23 F (2d) 44 (C.
C. A. 2nd, 1927). This case was followed in McKenna v. Anderson, 31 F
(2d) 1016 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1929), cert. den. 279 U. S. 869 (1929).
22
License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 462 (1866).
23 It was held in United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S. 450 (1921) that
Congress might continue to tax sales of liquor even though such sales were
made illegal by the Volstead Act. The Court said (p. 462), "The fact that
the statute in this aspect had a moral end in view as well as the raising of
revenue, presents no valid constitutional objection to its enactment."
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should also pay double the regular Internal Revenue tax, plus
a penalty of $500 upon retailers and $1,000 upon manufacturers. The problem in Lzpke v. Lederer24 was whether this
provision for a double tax, like the provisions for specific
penalties, was itself a penalty rather than a tax. The Court
so held, on the ground that the obvious purpose of this exaction was to further punish the illegal manufacture and sale
of liquor (and thereby discourage it) rather than to obtain
revenue thereby The result was that this double tax could
not be collected by distraint, as it could have been had it
really been a tax.
The doctrine of this case was followed in United States
2 5 where Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for
v. La Franca,
a unanimous Court, said.
"By Section 35, supra, it is provided that upon evidence of an illegal
sale under the National Prohibition Act, a tax shall be assessed and
collected in double the amount now provided by law. This, m reality,
is but to say that a person who makes an illegal sale shall be liable to
pay a 'tax' in double the amount of the tax imposed by pre-existing law
for making a legal sale, which existing law renders it impossible to
make. A tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of
government; a penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction mposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act. The two words
are not interchangeable, one for the other. No mere exercise of the
art of lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing;
and if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a
tax by the simple expedient of calling it such." 26
It is obvious, of course, that a penalty may be used as machinery for collecting a tax as well as for other governmental
purposes, but these opinions show dearly that a penalty is
itself not a tax. The obvious reason, of course, is that a penalty is not for the purpose of obtaining revenue (though it
may in fact produce some trifling amount of revenue)
The
purpose is to compel obedience to the law, and to the extent
that this is successful, no penalties will be imposed and no
revenue thus obtained. Even if the penalties are part of a
24259 U. S. 557 (1922).
25282 U. S. 568 (1931).
26 282 U. S. 572.
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tax law, their purpose is to compel the payment of the tax,
and thus to obtain the revenue from the tax itself and not
from the penalty
But in 1933 the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed, and
the federal powers with respect to liquor, except the taxing
power, went with it. However, Congress in an effort to assist dry states to enforce their laws attempted to impose a
special tax of $1,000 on anyone selling liquor in prohibition
territory This so-called tax was in addition to the regular
internal revenue taxes imposed upon all sales of liquor,
whether in dry or wet territory The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Consantine,27 held this so-called tax unconstitutional as a penalty rather than a tax. The majority of
the Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Roberts, said that even
on the face of the statute the exaction was a penalty, because it was so large, and because it applied only to such
sales as are illegal by local law As to the matter of motive,
the Court said.
"Reference was made m the.argument to decisions of this Court
holding that where the power to tax is conceded the motive for the
exaction may not be questioned. These are without relevance to the
present case. The point here is that the exaction is m no proper sense
a tax but a penalty imposed in addition to any the state may decree for
the violation of a state law. The cases cited dealt with taxes concededly within the realm of the federal power of taxation. They are
of a
not authority where, as in the present instance, under the guise 28
taxing act the purpose is to usurp the police powers of the state."
The dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice Cardozo
and concurred in by Justices Brandeis and Stone, does not
seem to dispute this reasoning, but asserts that a higher tax
may be justified in a prohibition territory, because presumably it will there be more difficult to collect any tax at all.
However this may be, the case is a clear authority that a
so-called tax which is intended to prohibit the activity against
27 296 U. S. 287 (1935). See also, to the same effect, Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., decided May 18, 1936, and invalidating the tax and other provisions of
the Guffey Coal Act.
28 296 U. S. 296.
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which it is levied, is not really a tax at all, and cannot be imposed by the federal government unless justified under some
other of its powers.
The second category of federal cases involving this problem directly, are those relating to so-called taxes on the sale
of grain in exchanges. Of this the leading case is Hill v.
Wallace,29 which held unconstitutional a tax of twenty cents
a bushel on "grain futures," except where the seller actually
owned the grain, or where the transaction was approved by
an administrative body, to be designated by the Secretary of
Agriculture. The tax was very clearly prohibitive, but Mr.
Chief Justice Taft, who wrote the opinion for the Court,
does not put much emphasis upon this. The Court assumes
to rely upon the very terms of the Act as showing that it
was intended for purposes of regulation rather than revenue,
especially the title, which included "providing for the regulations of boards of trade." It cannot be doubted, however, that the extremely prohibitive nature of the tax had a
considerable bearing. The Court was unanimous in invalidating the statute, though Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a separate opinion, expressed some doubt as to the right of the
particular plaintiff to bring the action.
Hill v. Wallace contains a dictum that a similar tax imposed by the same statute on puts, calls, etc., is probably
valid. This dictum, however, was repudiated a few years
later in Trusler v. Crooks." Here a unanimous Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that this
so-called excise tax was also unconstitutional. The Court
had perhaps not much difficulty in reaching this conclusion,
since the attorneys for the government practically conceded
that, in their opinion, this part of the Act was also unconstitutional. It is to be noted, however, that the only posssible
ground for invalidating this tax is not that it was regulatory
on its face, but rather that it was so plainly prohibitive in
amount that no such activity could possibly be carried on,
and therefore no revenue could be obtained. The Court occasionally insists that it will not invalidate what purports to
29259 U. S. 44 (1922).
30 269 U. S. 475 (1926).
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be a tax merely because it is excessive ;31 but this case shows
that it will, if the excess is sufficient to demonstrate that no
substantial revenue is to be received from it.
Next, and undoubtedly the most important, at least until
recently, are the child labor cases. Congress has for some
years been endeavoring to prohibit child labor; an undoubtedly desirable endeavor, but one which seems to be outside the
powers of the federal government, at least without a constitutional amendment.
Balked by the Supreme Court in an endeavor to accomplish this purpose through the power to regulate interstate commerce, 32 Congress turned to its taxing power and
passed a statute which endeavored to put an end to child
labor in the states, through imposing a tax of ten per cent of
the net income of any employer of child labor. It is not perhaps entirely clear that such a tax would actually be prohibitive, though considering the fact that many states already
had strict child labor laws, it would probably have been sufficient to have removed the present discrimination in favor
of states having less advanced laws of this type, or no laws
at all, and thereby to have largely, if not completely, put
an end to this activity
Undoubtedly, however, Congress was somewhat too frank
in showing by the terms of the Act that it was intended as
merely regulatory For instance, it was provided that the
tax would not be imposed where the employer was not aware
that the employee was a child below the age for which employment was subject to the tax.
The question of the constitutionality of this so-called tax
came before the Supreme Court in the so-called Child Labor
Tax case.33 Here again the praise-worthy purpose of Congress was defeated, the Court holding that the statute was
not really a tax act, but was rather a regulation in a matter
not withm the federal powers. With reference to the clauses
of the Act, which showed clearly that the Act was intended
31 See Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550 (1935), which will
be considered hereafter.
32 Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U. S. 251 (1918).

S3 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
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to be regulatory,3 4 the Court, speaking by Mr. Chief Justice

Taft, said
"In the light of these features of the act, a court must be blind not
to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the employment of
children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?"3 5

The Chief Justice also considers the problem in its more
fundamental aspects, in the following language
"The difference between a tax and a penalty is sometimes difficult
to define and yet the consequences of the distinction in the required
method of their collection often are important. Where the sovereign
enacting the law has power to impose both tax and penalty the difference between revenue production and mere regulation may be immaterial, but not so when one sovereign can impose a tax only, and the
power of regulation rests in another. Taxes are occasionally imposed
in the discretion of the legislature on proper subjects with the primary
motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental motive
of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They do
not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental motive. But
there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the
so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere
penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment." 36
Much of the rest of the opinion is taken up with distinguish-

ing other cases where the Court had sustained federal taxes
having somewhat similar regulatory purposes. These cases
will be considered later on. It is evident, however, that the
Child Labor Tax Case determines the law as enunciated by
the Federal Supreme Court, that a so-called tax which is intended merely to regulate or prohibit the activity purporting to be taxed, is not a tax. at all.
Any lingering doubt that the Court might not adhere to
this doctrine would seem to be removed by the very recent
case of United States v. Butler 37 This case held unconstitutional the so-called processing and floor-stock taxes imposed
E. g., the clause, already referred to, exempting an "innocent" employer.
35 259 U. S. 37.
36 259 U. S. 38.
37 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
34

WHEN IS A TAX NOT A TAX

by the Agricultural Adjustment Act (popularly known as the
A. A. A.)
These taxes (at least the processing tax) were
clearly intended as excise taxes, and as such seemed clearly
within the taxing power of the federal government. Furthermore, they are not on their face excessive, and appear
to be very far from prohibitive in their rates.
The objection which the majority, speaking by Mr. Justice Roberts, found to these taxes was that all the proceeds
thereof were ear-marked to be paid to farmers who would
sign contracts with the federal government to restrict their
acreage in accordance with the directions of the Secretary
of Agriculture. It cannot be denied that the federal government would, and actually did, receive substantial revenue
from these taxes, but the difficulty was that these receipts
were to be handed over in full to the farmers signing such
contracts, the government acting essentially as a conduit of
title, or at the most as a trustee. Furthermore, the Court
considered that while the tax itself was not prohibitive, the
federal government was, through this expedient, essentially
regulating agriculture in the states, in view of the fact that
economic pressure would force practically all farmers to
sign such contracts in order to receive the benefits provided
in the Act. And the Court held that the federal government
has no authority to regulate agriculture within the states.
As to the ultimate soundness of this deceision, there may
well be a question, especially in view of the vigorous dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Stone, in which Justices Brandeis
and Cardozo concurred. We are concerned only with the
strictly tax aspects of the decision, and indeed not in all of
these; for the Court considered at some length the relation
of the general taxing power of the federal government to the
so-called "general welfare" clause of the Constitution, and
held, or at least purported to hold, that the broad power of
taxation granted to Congress by that clause is not limited
by other grants of legislative power. Here, too, we have
no direct concern, we are interested only in what the Court
says as to the exact nature of a tax, as distinguished from
an exercise of an assumed power to regulate. But there is
plenty on this exact point.
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Thus, Mr. Justice Roberts, in speaking of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, says
"The statute not only avows an aim foreign to the procurement of
revenue for the support of government, but by its operation shows the
exaction laid upon processors to be the necessary means for the in'
tended control of agricultural production. 38

And again, speaking more directly of the processing tax, he
says
"It is inaccurate and misleading to speak of the exaction from
processors prescribed by the challenged act as a tax, or to say that as a
tax it is subject to no infirmity. A tax, in the general understanding
of the term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for
the support of the government. The word has never been thought
to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit
of another. We may concede that the latter sort of imposition is constitutional when imposed to effectuate regulation of a matter in which
both groups are interested and in respect of which there is a power
of legislative regulation. But manifestly no justification for it can
be found unless as an integral part of such regulation. The exaction
cannot be wrested out of its setting, denominated an exercise for raising revenue, and legalized by ignoring its purpose as a mere instrumentality for bringing about a desired end. To do this would be to
shut our eyes to what all others than we can see and understand. Child
Labor Tax Case, 259 U S. 20."39
Also it may be worth while to quote the following more general, but for our purposes extremely pertinent, observations
"The power of taxation, which is expressly granted, may, of course,
be adopted as a means to carry into operation another power also expressly granted. But resort to the taxing power to effectuate an end
which is not legitimate, not within the scope of the Constitution, is
4
obviously inadmissible." Q
It may be conceded that the foregoing language does not
necessarily decide the case. It may still be questioned, as
indeed the dissenting judges do question most emphatically,
3856 Sup. Ct. 316.
39 56 Sup. Ct. 317.
40 56 Sup. Ct. 321.
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whether it is pertinent with respect to the processing tax
itself. Nevertheless, they are far from dicta, for they are
all necessary steps in the reasoning of the Court in reaching
its decision. And it is apparent that such language enunciates the thesis already stated in this article, that a so-called
tax which is intended to penalize or prohibit the activity at
which it is directed and which, therefore, does not contemplate any substantial revenue, is really not a tax at all, in a
manner which could hardly be more emphatically and completely stated.
Furthermore, as already indicated, the dissenting opinion
does not seem to dispute the soundness of the language which
has been quoted from the majority opinion, it rather disputes the application of such principles to the processing tax.
Thus, Mr. Justice Stone says in the dissenting opinion with
reference to the argument with respect to the impropriety of
the regulation
"Here regulation, if any there be, is accomplished not by the tax,
but by the method by which its proceeds are expended, and would
equally be accomplished by any like use of public funds, regardless of
their source."41

He further argues that the regulation to which the majority
objects is merely incident to the tax, and therefore unobjectionable. In connection with the argument of the majority
on this point, he says
"The only conclusion to be drawn is that results become lawful
when they are incidents of those powers but unlawful when incident
to the similarly granted power to tax and spend." 42
It will be noted that the issue seems to be on a point not
within the scope of this article. The dissenting judges may
not feel as strongly on the proposition as do those whose
opinion prevailed, but they also seem to concede that a tax,
the sole purpose of which is to regulate and not to earn revenue, is not really a tax.
41 56 Sup. Ct. 325.
42 56 Sup. Ct. 327.
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If this were all, the argument might end at this point,
though it would perhaps be subject to the criticism that
rather hard work has been made of a perfectly simple and
apparently indisputable matter. But of course this is not
all. There are a number of Supreme Court decisions which
are actually, or at least apparently, in direct conflict with the
thesis already put forth in this article and so emphatically
stated in the cases already cited, especially the Butler case.
These cases uphold federal taxes which were, or at least
seemed to be, intended solely to drive out the activities subjected to tax, and in some cases, at least, actually did so. It
follows that little, if any, revenue was expected to be derived, or in fact was derived, from these so-called taxes. If
these decisions mean what they say, a tax which is not intended for revenue is still a tax, and the power to tax is still
the power to destroy-and in fact has been used for that
purpose. Such cases must, therefore, be carefully considered.
Perhaps not much attention need be paid to mere general
statements of the Supreme Court indicating that it will uphold as a tax an exaction which is prohibitive and, therefore,
not intended for revenue purposes. There are, perhaps,
many such statements, but they are not really decisive, unless
the actual decision is to this effect.
Typical of such general statements and perhaps worth
quoting because it is so very recent, is the following excerpt
from the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the
majority of the Court in Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis 43
"To condemn a levy on the sole ground that it is excessive would
be to usurp a power vested not in the court but in the legislature, and
to exercise the usurped power arbitrarily by substituting our conceptions of public policy for those of the legislative body. In Veazze
Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, a tax of ten per cent on the notes of
state banks was upheld although it 'drove out of existence every State
bank of circulation within a year or two after its passage.' See Loan
Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663, 664. -In Knowlton v.

Moore, 178 U. S.41, in sustaining an excise tax this court said, 'if a
lawful tax can be defeated because the power which is manifested by
43 294 U. S. 550 (1935).
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its imposition may when further exercised be destructive, it would
follow that every lawful tax would become unlawful, and therefore
no taxation whatever could be levied.' (P 60) * * Once the lawfulness of the method of levying the tax is affirmed, the judicial function ceases. He deludes himself by a false hope who supposes that,
if this court shall at some future tume conclude the burden of the
44
exaction has become inordinately oppressive, it can interdict the tax."
This language sounds rather surprising in view of the language of the same Judge, which has already been quoted from
Unted States v. Butler 41 Furthermore, the decision of the
Court had the effect of invalidating a Kentucky tax on sales,
simply because it was at varying rates according to the gross
business of the retailer. This was held to be a denial of
equal protection of the laws. Since the maximum rate was
only one per cent on the sales, the decision seems rather narrow, and the author is inclined to concur in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo, that the tax is distinctly
reasonable. However this may be, a court statement that a
tax cannot be invalidated because it is prohibitive, but that
it can be invalidated because of a very limited classification
of rates, with a maximum of one per cent, does not seem
worthy of being taken too seriously
We turn, then, to cases which actually or purportedly do
sustain a tax, notwithstanding that it is prohibitive or otherwise plainly not for revenue purposes. And of these the first,
48
though the easiest to dispose of, is Yeazze Bank v. Fenno,
cited in the excerpt from Mr. Justice Robert's opinion in
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, above.
feazie Bank v. Fenno sustained the validity of a federal
tax of ten per cent on notes intended to circulate as money
:ssued by state banks. The tax was prohibitive, and was so
intended, in fact, it very promptly brought about the desired
47
result of absolutely ending all such issues of state banks.
44 294 U. S. 562-3.
45 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).

Cf.. Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475 (1926),

where the Supreme Court invalidated a purported tax, apparently on the sole
ground that it took judicial notice that the tax was prohibitive in rate.
46 8 Wall. (U. S.) 533 (1869).
47See Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884), at 596, Tax Commission
v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931), at 552-3.
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In meeting the argument that the tax was so excessive as to
evidence an intent by Congress to destroy the state banks, or
at least this particular function of such state banks, the majority of the Court, speaking by Mr Chief Justice Chase,
made two answers. The first of these is as follows
"The first answer to this is that the judicial cannot prescribe to the
legislative departments of the government limitations upon the exercise
of its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not
to the courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected. So
if a particular tax bears heavily upon a corporation, or a class of corporations, it cannot, for that reason only, be pronounced contrary to

the Constitution.""8

This language is certainly contrary to the thesis of this
article, at least as it applies to the very case before the Court
-that is, a so-called tax which is not merely burdensome but
actually and intentionally prohibitive. But the Court gave
another reason for rejecting this argument of the taxpayer,
which is submitted to be the real one. This answer is summarized in the following language
"Having thus, in the exercise of undisputed constitutional powers,
undertaken to provide a currency for the whole country, it cannot be
questioned that Congress may, constitutionally, secure the benefit of
it to the people by appropriate legislation. To this end, Congress has
denied the quality of legal tender to foreign coins, and has provided
by law against the imposition of counterfeit and base coin on the community. To the same end, Congress may restrain, by suitable enactments, the circulation as money of any notes not issued under its own
authority. Without this power, indeed, its attempt to secure a sound
49
and uniform currency for the country must be futile."
This indicates that Feazi Bank v. Fenno is easily made
consistent with the thesis of this article. The so-called tax in
that case was not really a tax; it was merely a method, though
perhaps a rather clumsy one, of exercising the broad currency powers of Congress by driving out the notes of state
banks as a circulating medium. The completeness and dras48 9 Wall. 548.
49 8 Wall. 549.
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ticness of the Congressional powers with respect to currency
has been recently and clearly restated by the Court. 50 It follows that if Congress had passed, a statute expressly prohibiting the circulation of state bank notes, such a statute would
have been entirely constitutional. The only point of Feazie
Bank v. Fenno is that such prohibition may formally be accomplished through the method of imposing a prohibitive tax;
but this is still not really a tax.
More troublesome are the oleomargarine cases. Here we
have interesting cases involving both state and federal taxes;
but so far as the federal tax is concerned, it seems clear that,
unlike a so-called tax with respect to currency, it must be
sustained as a tax or it cannot be sustained at all.
The earliest case relating to the federal statutes was In re
Kollock, 51 where the Court, in deciding certain questions of
administration in connection with the law, stated incidentally
that the law is on its face one for levying taxes and must be
assumed to be for the purpose of raising revenue. Certainly
no objection can be made to this. But it becomes necessary to
examine the terms of the law somewhat more fully This can
52
best be done in connection with McCray v. United States.
The case just mentioned is undoubtedly the leading case
with respect to the federal oleomargarine tax. The tax was
ten cents a pound on colored oleomargarine, and only onefourth of a cent on uncolored oleomargarine. The tax on colored oleomargarine was concededlv prohibitive, its purpose
was obviously to protect dairy farmers by preventing the sale
of oleomargarine colored to look like butter. The opinion
of the Court was by Mr. Justice White. Three members of
the Court dissented, but no dissenting opinion was written.
The-opinion starts with the contention that the Act on its
face imposes an excise tax, and goes on to say that if the
Legislature abuses its powers of taxation, the invalidation of
such abuse by the judiciary would be an abuse by the judiciary
of its powers. This looks somewhat like an early statement
of a very curious idea of Mr. Justice White, that the Fifth
50 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
51165 U. S. 526 (1897).

52 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
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Amendment to the Constitution is no check upon the federal
taxing powers; 53 an idea which is absurd on its face and is
now thoroughly repudiated. It fits in, however, with his reference in the opinion to Chief Justice Marshall's theory that
"the power to tax involves the power to destroy "
The argument is perhaps well summed up in the following
language
"Undoubtedly, in determining whether a particular act is within a
granted power, its scope and effect are to be considered. Applying this
rule to the acts assailed, it is self-evident that on their face they levy

an excise tax. That being their necessary scope and operation, it follows that the acts are within the grant of power. The argument to
the contrary rests on the proposition that, although the tax be within
the power, as enforcing it will destroy or restrict the manufacture of
artificially colored oleomargarine, therefore the power to levy the tax
did not obtain. This, however, is but to say that the question of
power depends, not upon the authority conferred by the Constitution,
but upon what may be the consequence arising from the exercise of
the lawful authority."
"Since, as pointed out in all the decisions referred to, the taxing
power conferred by the Constitution knows no limits except those expressly stated in that instrument, it must follow, if a tax be within the
lawful power, the exertion of that power may not be judicially re'54
strained because of the results to arise from its exercise."
Such language obviously represents the same confusion between a very high and burdensome tax, which is usually unwise but is nevertheless still a tax, and a prohibitive tax. A
somewhat similar confusion is evidenced in the following

statement
"It hence results, that even although it be true that the effect of
the tax in question is to repress the manufacture of artificially colored
oleomargarine, it cannot be said that such repression destroys rights
which no free government could .destroy." 55
No doubt a "free government" can prohibit or at least
severely limit the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine,
5S Mr. Justice White, after becoming Chief Justice, stated clearly this
theory, in Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1914), and in Brushaber
v. United States, 240 U. S. 1 (1916).
54 195 U. S. 59.

55 195 U. S. 63.
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particularly when it is so colored as to be easily mistaken
for butter; but it hardly follows that the federal government, lacking as it does general police powers, has any such
authority It is possible that the doctrine of the McCray
case can be justified as a regulation of interstate commerce
to prevent fraud upon consumers, but this is at least very
doubtful. It seems impossible to deny that this case is an
authority to the effect that a prohibitive tax, though obviously not intended to produce revenue, is nevertheless a
tax and within the federal taxing power.
Several recent cases involve somewhat similar state taxes
on oleomargarine, and are of interest not only as such, but
also as throwing light on the Court's present view with respect to the federal tax. It seems to be settled that a state
may absolutely prohibit the manufacture of oleomargarine.5 6
Therefore, on the same reasoning as before in connection with
the tax on state bank notes, a state might carry out this
power by imposing a prohibitive tax without it being a tax
in fact.
However, in the recent case of Magnano Co. v. Hamilton," the Court sustained a Washington tax of fifteen cents
a pound on oleomargarine as a tax, although such an exaction
is clearly prohibitive. Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for
a unanimous Court, closed his opinion as follows
"From the beginning of our government, the courts have sustained
taxes although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior
ends which, considered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of
the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment. Those decisions, as the foregoing discussion discloses,
rule the present case."' 8
Since the McCray case was cited in this opinion with approval, and its reasoning was followed, it must still be regarded as in good standing; and the result would seem to
be that most prohibitive taxes are not taxes, but a prohibitive
tax on oleomargarine is still a tax. But that the Court
56 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1887).
57 292 U. S. 40 (1934).

58 292 U. S.47.
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does not entirely disregard the anomalousness of this result is
indicated by Glenn v. Field Packing Co.,59 where a Kentucky
tax of ten cents a pound on the sale of oleomargarine was
held invalid under the law of the state because, as the District
Court said, it "was in reality a prohibition on the sale of
oleomargarine in Kentucky, and hence was invalid under the
state constitution."
Kentucky thus apparently adopts the
view that a prohibitive tax is not a tax.
The result seems to be that the oleomargarine cases are
somewhat contrary to the thesis of this article, and to the
present view of the Court with respect to most sorts of monetary exactions. So far as this is true, they must be deemed
to rest only upon precedent made at a time when the Court
had not become as aware as it now is of the unsoundness of
Chief Justice Marshall's dictum.
More complicated still are the decisions with regard to the
Harrison Anti-Narcotic Law, a law designed to prohibit the
sale of narcotics, except for proper medicinal purposes. One
of the important methods used for carrying out this purpose
was by the imposition of a federal tax.
The leading case with respect to this part of the law is
United States v. Doremus.6 0 This involved the law as
originally enacted. The only tax was one of a dollar a year
upon dealers in narcotics, though there were elaborate provisions as to registration and requiring records of sales. Obviously, the difficulty about this so-called tax is not that it is
prohibitive, it is rather purely nominal. Nevertheless, it is
subject to the same basic attack that it is not intended for
purposes of revenue, the revenue itself being nominal and
probably much less than the cost of administering the Act.
In no realistic sense, therefore, can this be regarded as a
revenue measure.
Nevertheless, the Court, by a five to four vote, sustained
it as a revenue act, the provisions for records, etc., being
regarded as merely incidental to the tax. This is undoubtedly
another example of the legal tail wagging the dog, since the
159290 U. S. 177 (1933).

60 249 U. S. 86 (1919).
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tax itself was plainly incidental to these administrative provisions. Mr. Justice Day, in writing for the majority, said
"Of course Congress may not in the exercise of federal power exert
authority wholly reserved to the States. Many decisions of this court
have so declared. And from an early day the court has held that the
fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power
does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject. If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing
authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it. Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, in which case this court sustained a tax on
a state bank issue of circulating notes. McGray v. United States, 195
U. S. 27, where the power was thoroughly considered, and an act levying a special tax upon oleomargarine artificially colored was sustained." 6 1

He thus relies upon cases previously discussed, which purport
to support, under the taxing power, an exaction not intended
for revenue, without noticing the rather doubtful grounds
upon which these cases now rest.

But already in United States v. fin Fuey Moy, 62 the Court
had recognized the somewhat questionable nature of this
justification of the law, by giving it a very narrow construction-one clearly not consonant with the purpose of the regulatory provisions, which were really the heart of the Act.
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated that the
Act can only be sustained as a revenue measure, and said.
"It may be assumed that the statute has a moral end as well as revenue in view, but we are of opinion that the District Court, in treating
those ends as to be reached only through a revenue measure and within
the limits of a revenue measure, was right." 63

Subsequent to this, the Act was amended so as to drastically
increase the fees, and in addition to impose a tax of one cent
an ounce upon all sales of narcotics. This resulted in substantial revenue being obtained, so that the Act was properly
61249 U. S. 93.
62 241 U. S. 394 (1916).
63 241 U. S. 402.
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sustained as a revenue measure. 64 Furthermore, in Nigro v.
Unted States, 65 a much broader construction of the Act was
sustained than had been permitted in the Jin Fuey Moy case, 66
which was distinguished mainly upon the ground that the recent amendments had made the Act plainly a revenue measure. Mr. Chief Justice Taft obviously had some difficulties
with the previous cases and showed his appreciation of the
very doubtful grounds upon which the original Act had been
sustained, by saying"Four members of the Court dissented in the Doremus case, because
of opinion that the court below had correctly held the Act of Congress,
in so far as it embraced the matters complained of, to be beyond its
constitutional power, and that the statute, in Section 2, was a mere
pretext as a tax measure and was in fact an attempt by Congress to
exercise the police power reserved to the States and to regulate and
restrict the sale and distribution of dangerous and noxious narcotic
drugs. Since that time, this Court has held that Congress by merely
calling an Act a taxing act cannot make it a legitimate exercise of
taxing power under Section 8 of Article I of the Federal Constitution,
if in fact the words of the act show clearly its real purpose is otherwise. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 38. By the Revenue Act
of 1918, the Anti-Narcotic Act was amended so as to increase the
taxes under Section 1, making an occupation tax for a producer of
narcotic drugs of $24 a year, for a wholesale dealer, $12, for a retail

dealer, $6.00, and for a physician administering the narcotic, $3.00.
The amendment also imposes an excise tax of one cent an ounce on
the sale of the drug. Thus the income from the tax for the Government becomes substantial. Under the Narcotic Act, as now amended,
the tax amounts to about one million dollars a year, and since the
amendment in 1919 it has benefited the Treasury to the extent of
nearly nine million dollars. If there was doubt as to the character of
this Act-that it is not, as alleged, a subterfuge-it has been removed
by the change whereby what was a nominal tax before was made a
substantial one. It is certainly a taxing act now as we held in the
67
Aiston case."

Justices McReynolds, Butler, and Sutherland all dissented
the first two writing separate dissenting opinions.

Both of

64 AIston v. United States, 274 U. S. 289 (1927).

65 276 U. S. 332 (1928).
66 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394 (1916),
67276 U. S. 352-3.

upra, note 62.
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these opinions assert that the law is still a mere regulatory
act, and therefore beyond the powers of the federal government. Indeed, Mr. Justice McReynolds had been able to
carry the whole Court with him in his opinion in Linder v.
United States, 68 that the Act even as amended could not be
construed to prohibit sales by a registered physician of morphine, even to a known addict. The Court agreed that if
the Act were construed so as to prohibit this, it would be
dearly outside of any provision which would be incidental to
the taxing part of the Act. The cases are thus somewhat inconsistent, but all agree that the Act is sustainable only as
a revenue measure.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that these narcotics
cases, especially United States v. Doremus, 9 might possibly
be cited as contrary to the thesis of this article, that a tax
which is not intended for revenue is in fact not a tax. However, the almost apologetic attitude which the Court has
taken in other cases with reference to the Doremus case,
shows that it is recognized to be on a somewhat unstable
foundation. At the most it may be deduced from these cases
that the Court will go a long way to support a highly desirable regulatory law under the guise of taxation, but it
certainly will not do so if the guise is too easily and palpably
pierced, either on the face of the law or by matters of which
the Court will take judicial notice.
And finally we come to the tariff cases. Here the problem
would seem to be very definitely involved. This is not always
the case, for tariffs are often-perhaps usually-for purposes
of revenue, at least in substantial part. But not infrequently
they are not intended for this purpose at all. They are actually and avowedly for the purpose of protecting our supposedly weak infant industries from destruction by foreign
competition. For this purpose, the rates are made so high
as to be practically prohibitive, and thus to reduce the revenue
from imports of commodities thus protected to a nominal
amount. Here, then we seem to have a prohibitive tax.
68268 U. S. 5 (1925).
69249 U. S. 86 (1919), supra, note 60.
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That tariffs are often for the primary and occasionally exclusive purpose of protection rather than for revenue, has
often been recognized,7 0 and it has been frankly avowed by
the Supreme Court itself in Hampton & Co. v. Unted
States."1
In this case the "flexible tariff" provisions of the Tariff Act
of 1922 were sustained. The effect of these provisions was
that after a proper investigation by the Tariff Commission,
which showed an insufficient tariff rate on a certain commodity
to equalize the advantage of a foreign producer, the President was empowered to increase the tariff so as to wipe out
this differential. The Court held that this was not an improper delegation of legislative power; a conclusion which is
perhaps doubtful in view of more recent decisions. 72 However, the point which chiefly interests us is the definite decision
of the Court that Congress has power to levy a tariff for the
purpose of protecting domestic industries. As to this, the
unanimous Court, speaking by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, said
"It is contended that the only power of Congress in levying of
customs duties is to create revenue, and that it is unconstitutional to
frame the customs duties with any other view than that of revenue
raising. It undoubtedly is true that during the political life of this
country there has been much discussion between parties as to the wisdom of the policy of protection, and we may go further and say as to
its constitutionality, but no historian, whatever his view of the wisdom
of the policy of protection, would contend that Congress, since the first
revenue Act, in 1789, has not assumed that it was within its power in
making provision for the collection of revenue, to put taxes upon importations and to vary the subjects of such taxes or rates in an effort
Nation by protecting
to encourage the growth of the industries of the
13
home production against foreign competition."
This certainly recognizes a power to impose a prohibitive
tax; though the Court has also recognized the sharp difference between the provisions of the tariff acts for the imposi70 See e. g., Morton v. Macon, 111 Ga. 162, 36 S. E. 627 (1900), at 36 S.
E. 639.
71276 U. S. 394 (1928).

72Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935).
73276 U. S. 411.
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tion of the tariff and the penalty provisions operative in case
of attempted violation.

74

Obviously, the existence and judicial support of such purely
protective tariffs constitute a negation of the thesis of this
article, unless such power of Congress can be justified in some
other way than by its taxing power. And here the problem
of regulation of foreign commerce comes into the picture.
Whether or not the power of Congress to regulate foreign
commerce is exclusive, it is undoubtedly complete. 75 A monetary exaction may undoubtedly be imposed under that power
without it necessarily being a tax. Thus, an act of Congress,
imposing upon steamship companies a charge of fifty cents
a person for all non-citizens brought to the United States,
the fund so raised to be used for the relief of needy immi76
grants, has been sustained as a regulation of commerce.
The Court said expressly that this charge was not a tax.
If, then, the protective tariff is a regulation of commerce and
not a tax, it can be sustained without resort to the idea that
"the power to tax involves the power to destroy"
And this is exactly what the Supreme Court has done in the
77
recent decision of Board of Trustees v. United States.
Here the University of Illinois had imported certain scientific apparatus for use in its laboratories. A tariff having
been exacted upon such importation, the University sued to
recover the amount so paid. There can be little doubt that
the University should have recovered, if the tariff is to be
regarded as a tax. There is nothing better settled than that
the federal government may not directly tax a governmental
function of a state, and there was, of course, no dispute that
education is a governmental function.
Yet the Court unanimously held that the University had
properly been compelled to pay a tariff on this apparatus and
could, therefore, not recover it. The Court was unanimous,
the opinion being written by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes. The
74 Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 605 (1903).
75 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1 (1824).
76 Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884).
77 289 U. S. 48 (1933).
78 The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 113 (1871).
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theory was that tariffs are regulations of commerce and are
not for the purpose of revenue, even though revenue may
incidentally be obtained. A regulation of interstate or foreign commerce by Congress is, of course, binding upon a
state.
The soundness of this reasoning is perhaps extremely questionable. 79 But after all, this is not of very great importance. The Court has performed the feat of sustaining the
imposition of a tariff without calling into play the taxing
power of Congress. If the tariff is not a tax, its motives
and effects are of no concern in our study of the nature of
taxation. It suffices that the tariff cases are not contrary to
our thesis.
One other federal statute appears to represent an attempted exercise of the taxing power for purely regulatory
purposes. About twenty-five years ago a statute was passed,
putting a prohibitive tax upon the manufacture and sale of
the old-fashioned phosphorous matches.8 0 It was desired to
put an end to this industry, because of the serious effect which
working in phosphorous had upon the health of the laborers.
Curiously enough, this legislation, which was completely
successful in ending the industry, seems never to have been
attacked in court. At least no case with respect to it went
up to the Supreme Court. Just why this should have been
so is hard to determine. It may be surmised that one reason
was that in the light of such cases as McCray v. United
States,8 1 which was then the prevailing authority, it ias
thought that a contention that a prohibitive tax was not within
the taxing power could not be sustained. Furthermore, it was
perhaps thought that the legislation might be sustained under
the power to regulate interstate commerce, though the later
decision of Hammer v. Dagenhart 2 seems to invalidate this
79 See the vigorous attack upon Board of Trustees v. United States, supra,
by Svembjorn Johnson, in an article in (1934) 68 U. S. L. R. 248, Federal
Taxation Affecting State Instrumentalities. Mr. Johnson was the counsel for
the University of Illinois in this case. And see Hart, Processing Taxes and
Protective Tariffs, (1936) 49 Harv. L. R. 610.
80 26 U. S. C. A., ch. 13.
81 195 U. S. 27 (1904), supra, note 52.
82 247 U. S. 251 (1918), supra, note 32.
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theory And it may well be that persons concerned in the
industry did not dare to defy public sentiment by attempting
to contest the law, and merely dosed up their business. At
any rate, the business was ended, and there is now no one to
contest the law Furthermore, any attempt to revive the industry would probably be immediately stopped by state legislation. The match statute is, therefore, at the most, .a claim
by Congress to impose a prohibitive tax, but without the support of judicial sanction.
On principle then, it would seem that a so-called tax is
not actually a tax unless it is imposed for purposes of revenue.
Of course this need not be the sole purpose, since a tax can
undoubtedly be used partially for regulatory purposes and
even to somewhat discourage the activity against which the
tax is directed. Nor can it be invalidated merely because the
revenue obtained is not very large, since this may indicate
only that the tax is unwise. But if judging from the face of
the statute, which purports to impose the tax, or probably
when it does not so appear but is within the judicial knowledge of the Court, the purpose of the legislative body is
clearly not to obtain substantial revenue, but solely to regulate or prohibit the industry against which the exaction is
directed, the exaction is not really a tax. If it can be sustained at all, this can be done only under some other governmental power-ordinarily the police power.
There are comparatively few authorities on this precise
point, except with respect to federal taxes. The reason for
this is that the states have general police power, so that an
exaction which cannot be regarded as a tax may be (and
usually is) nevertheless sustainable under such police power.
The authorities with respect to state taxation, therefore, ordinarily fail to make this distinction very dear.
But with respect to federal taxes, the distinction, if it is
sound, is usually applicable, since the federal government has
no general police power. And it has usually been accepted, at
least in the modern cases. There is a great deal of language
in Federal Supreme Court decisions which seems to disregard
this distinction, but on analysis, it will usually be found either
that the distinction is not applicable, since the exaction was
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intended to furnish a substantial amount of revenue, though
it had other purposes, or else, as in the case of the so-called
tax on state bank notes,8 3 the exaction is not really a tax but
falls within other powers of the federal government.
The only lines of cases in the federal courts which at all
directly involve the sustaining of a so-called tax as such,
where the exaction is not for purposes of revenue, are the
oleomargarine cases and the anti-narcotic cases. The oleomargarine cases, so far as they are still in good standing, are
practically conceded by the Court to rest upon authority
rather than principle. The anti-narcotic cases have themselves been distinctly limited by the Court, and are now justified, because the present Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act has
become clearly a revenue measure. And the modern decisions, especially with respect to child labor8 4 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 5 enunciate this principle with great
precision and force. It seems, then, that authority and principle substantially coincide with respect to this matter. A
"tax" is not a tax unless it is imposed for the substantial purpose of raising revenue.
83 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 533 (1869), supra, note 46.
84 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20 (1922), supra, note 33.
85 United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936), supra, note 37.

